A Multi-State Solution That Works?

Jay Bahadur had a recent op-ed at the New York Times that advocated for the international recognition of Puntland, a self governing region in the former country of Somalia.  Considering the region formerly known as Somalia is interesting only in regards to terrorists or pirates, his “sell” on the issue of recognition is centered on Puntland being a partner in fighting the latter.  This is an interesting thought but not one I want to explore.  Rather, are there cases when splitting up a sovereign entity, or the remains thereof, makes not only good practical sense but is also a good precedent for international law?

Before I jump in here, a few points that need to be laid out.  One, I don’t consider Somalia to be a country any more, hence my previous snark.  The “government” we support is a bunch of men who exerted little control when they were backed by Ethiopian tanks and now have even less.  Their relevancy to the actual population consistently hovers at 0.  So while it’s helpful to refer to Somalia for the geographic connotations, for me the idea of Somalia has eroded from 1991 to the ineffectual dreams of Western and African policy makers to end the chaos with as little change to the status quo as possible.  I’m not sure in this case that the status quo is anything bad, but it certainly doesn’t seem to spend much time in reality.

Secondly, I tend to err on the side that two state solutions and other kinds of partitions are rarely successful.  India and Pakistan and Israel and Palestine are two cases that spring immediately to mind.  Peaceful partitions that did little more than generate a bunch of wars.  I tend to blame the United Kingdom for this.  If you look at some land conflicts in Latin America, Venezuela-Guyana, Nicaragua-Colombia, Guatemala-Belize, and Argentina-UK (Falklands)–you can see that when the British split up territory, they never quite ended the conflict before leaving.  The counter argument, of course, is that colonial borders that brought together diverse and even enemy populations cannot succeed as sovereign entities, much of Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan all appear to strengthen that case.  Even a relatively successful democracy like Kenya can’t seem to get over ethnic tensions, so maybe splitting them up does work.

Which brings us to Somalia.  Somalia doesn’t really exist, but Puntland has a representative democracy, functioning (but poor) government, and at least some capacity to defend and police its country.  In many respects, it fits not only the definition of a nation state, but that of a democracy, which is quite astounding in a region that isn’t necessarily known by its democratic credentials.  Moreover, I think there is a strong case here that if we support something viable, which Puntland seems to be, we have a better chance of influencing the destiny of the Horn of Africa than we would if we, say, supported an ineffectual sham government who has only held on to Mogadishu for two years, and tenuously at that.

So practical wisdom says back the horse in Puntland, it’s a sure winner, right?

Unfortunately, one of the nagging parts of international law is that it’s all precedent based.  The short hand is that if a majority of the countries consider something to be normal practice, then it is international law.  The only “written” law is contained in UN conventions and bi- and multi-lateral treaties.  There is, of course, a bunch of ways to avoid being accountable to international law, such as refusing to sign conventions, refusing to join international groups, and to make vociferously clear in both written statement and and spoken pronouncement your reservations, understandings, and declarations about how you intend to (not) follow international law.  But in general, your best bet is that if you don’t like the implications for your sovereignty, you don’t support something.

This is what makes the Puntland case a little frustrating.  In northeastern Somalia there is a region that has everything we want and maybe more from an African ally, but if we support it, the implications are not something we’ll like.  Consider that we fought a civil war based on the principle that the South had no legal right to secede from the Union.  In more contemporary terms, an internationally recognized Puntland has some troubling implications for Morocco, India, Turkey, the Sudan, and a host of other nations.  After all, the compelling arguments for Puntland’s recognition could easily be extended to a place like Kurdistan, which would be most inconvenient for Turkey, the US, and any ambitions for a federal Iraq.

Which leaves us, the international community, in quite a bind.  On the one hand, there are many practical but situational specific solutions that would make stabilizing developing countries much easier than it is today.  Giving Puntland money to fight Somali piracy makes our warships in the Gulf of Aden much more likely to be successful. On the other hand, sometimes process is more than just a ritual to make us feel like we’ve had a say.  Process breeds order, and to upset order threatens more than formality.  The very underpinnings of how the world functions today, how countries interact, how trade happens, and why there are relatively few wars of aggression between nations, are all related to a respect of process and thus, order.

So Puntland cannot be it’s own nation, though in the de facto sense, we really have nothing to counter that reality.  In the grand scheme of things, perhaps this is small potatoes.  However, it does beg a question of the current world order–how useful is international decorum and process when it is opposed to practical realities?  Is a genocide in Sudan something we’re willing to allow because we can’t get consensus in the Security Council?  And conversely, are we as a nation really able to act morally and sensibly outside of international consensus?